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Abstract 
This article examines individuals’ expectations in a social hypothesis testing task. Participants 
selected questions from a list to investigate the presence of personality traits in a target 
individual. They also identified the responses that they expected to receive and the likelihood 
of the expected responses. The results of two studies indicated that when people asked 
questions inquiring about the hypothesized traits that did not entail strong a priori beliefs, they 
expected to find evidence confirming the hypothesis under investigation. These confirming 
expectations were more pronounced for symmetric questions, in which the diagnosticity and 
frequency of the expected evidence did not conflict. When the search for information was 
asymmetric, confirming expectations were diminished, likely as a consequence of either the 
rareness or low diagnosticity of the hypothesis-confirming outcome. We also discuss the 
implications of these findings for confirmation bias.  
 
 
Keywords: social hypothesis testing; expectations; asymmetric search; symmetric search; 
diagnosticity; trade-off; confirmation bias. 
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Confirming expectations in asymmetric and symmetric social hypothesis testing 
 
In everyday situations, people are called upon to recall and obtain information. 
Gathering incomplete or one-sided evidence may contribute to inefficiencies and errors in 
judgment and ultimately in the chosen course of action. Moreover, the extent and type of 
information that individuals search for might bias judgment even when the obtained evidence 
has been efficiently processed (e.g., Cameron & Trope, 2004; Trope & Thompson, 1997).  
Hypothesis-testing tasks have been used to investigate how people obtain, test, and 
evaluate information (e.g., Evett, Devine, Hirt, & Price, 1994; McKenzie, 2004; Nelson, 
2005; Poletiek, 2001; Wason, 1960). In testing phases, it has been found that people tend to 
look for information consistent with the hypothesis rather than considering both 
disconfirming and confirming evidence (e.g., Baron, Beattie, & Hershey, 1988; Cherubini, 
Rusconi, Russo, Di Bari, & Sacchi, 2010; Devine, Hirt, & Gehrke, 1990; Einhorn & Hogarth, 
1978; Evett et al., 1994; Klayman, 1995; Klayman & Ha, 1987; Snyder & Swann, 1978; 
Wason, 1960, 1966, 1968). Recent experimental research in social cognition has found that 
when the tested hypothesis involves strong a priori beliefs (e.g., stereotypes), subjects tend to 
ask asymmetric questions that allow for binary answers (“yes” vs. “no”) of differing 
informativeness and frequency (e.g., Cameron & Trope, 2004; Sacchi, Rusconi, Russo, 
Bettiga, & Cherubini, in press; Trope & Liberman, 1996; Trope & Thompson, 1997). A 
question is symmetric when the answers that confirm or disconfirm the hypothesis are equally 
diagnostic and likely, provided that the prior probabilities of the hypotheses are equal. For 
example, testing the hypothesis that an individual is extroverted by asking “Do you like 
parties?” anticipates a confirming answer of “yes”, which is as informative and likely as a 
disconfirming answer of “no”. An asymmetrically confirming question (e.g., testing the 
hypothesis that an individual is extroverted by asking “Are you always the life of the party?”) 
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is a query for which a confirming answer (here, “yes”) is more diagnostic but less likely than 
a disconfirming answer of “no”, given the equal prior probabilities of the hypotheses. 
Conversely, an asymmetrically disconfirming question (e.g., testing the hypothesis that an 
individual is extroverted by asking “Do you like to stay home alone on Saturday night?”) 
anticipates a more diagnostic but less likely disconfirming answer (here, “yes”) than the 
hypothesis-confirming answer (“no”), provided equal prior probabilities of the hypotheses 
(e.g., Brambilla, Rusconi, Sacchi, & Cherubini, 2011, Study 2; Cameron & Trope, 2004; 
Cherubini et al., 2010; Sacchi et al., in press; Trope & Liberman, 1996; Trope & Thompson, 
1997). 
Accordingly, in contrast to symmetric questions, asymmetric questions might imply a 
trade-off between the diagnosticity and probability of the responses. Answers with greater 
probability have less diagnostic value than answers with lower probability (e.g., McKenzie, 
2006; Poletiek, 2001, chaps. 1 and 2; Poletiek & Berndsen, 2000)1. Whether people are more 
sensitive to the diagnosticity or probability of responses to asymmetric questions is currently 
under investigation. The issue is relevant because the diagnosticity/frequency trade-off has 
implications for confirmation bias, which can be defined as unwarranted confidence in a 
working hypothesis (e.g., McKenzie, 2004, 2006). Skov and Sherman (1986) and Slowiaczek, 
Klayman, Sherman, and Skov (1992) claim that the preference for asymmetrically 
disconfirming questions (which they term “extreme” tests) found in their studies indicated a 
tendency to confirm the working hypothesis because these questions imply that the 
probability of finding confirming evidence is high. In contrast, Poletiek and Berndsen (2000) 
suggested the preference for asymmetrically confirming questions in their tasks with realistic 
contexts indicated a tendency to confirm the working hypothesis because participants in their 
studies preferred the more diagnostic confirming evidence that this type of question provides.  
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Regardless of whether the relationship between information-seeking strategies and 
confirmation bias is based on a tendency to maximize the probability or diagnosticity of 
hypothesis-confirming evidence, the motivation for using particular information-seeking 
strategies has often been neglected. In particular, there is little evidence regarding whether 
people expect to receive highly diagnostic or probable answers to their asymmetric 
hypothesis-confirming questions.  
If individuals who prefer to ask asymmetrically disconfirming questions want to 
maximize the probability of receiving hypothesis-confirming answers, this information-
seeking strategy would reflect confirming intentions. However, if individuals want to 
maximize the diagnosticity of the anticipated answers, this strategy would reflect 
disconfirming intentions (e.g., Poletiek & Berndsen, 2000). Similarly, choosing an 
asymmetrically confirming question might reflect a desire to either maximize the informative 
value of a confirming answer or probability of a disconfirming answer. 
Evett et al. (1994) addressed the issue of the expectations underlying the information-
seeking strategies but confined their analysis to positive (“hypothesis true”) and negative 
(“alternative true”) hypothesis-testing questions. A hypothesis-testing question is positive 
when a positive answer (“yes”) supports the working hypothesis (e.g., testing the hypothesis 
that an individual is extroverted by asking “Do you enjoy making new acquaintances?”). 
Evett et al. (1994) found that 67.6% of participants selected positive questions when testing 
the hypothesis that an individual was introverted/extroverted; this finding is consistent with 
several studies indicating that people are prone to use a positive testing strategy (e.g., 
Dardenne & Leyens, 1995; Devine et al., 1990; Klayman, 1995; Klayman & Ha, 1987; Skov 
& Sherman, 1986; Snyder & Swann, 1978). Furthermore, regardless of the hypothesis tested, 
more than 90% of participants expected to receive hypothesis-confirming answers (i.e., “yes” 
answers to positive questions and “no” answers to negative questions).  
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The aim of the present study was to extend this previous investigation of an 
individual’s expectations when testing hypotheses regarding personality traits by accounting 
for question symmetry or asymmetry (e.g., Cameron & Trope, 2004; Poletiek & Berndsen, 
2000; Skov & Sherman, 1986; Trope & Thompson, 1997). In contrast to positivity or 
negativity, question symmetry or asymmetry does not reflect if the expected answers match 
the content of the hypothesis being tested but the extent of information that the responses 
convey (Cherubini et al., 2010). The question properties of positivity/negativity and 
symmetry/asymmetry are mutually independent (Cherubini et al., 2010). The present study 
thus extended the research of Evett et al. (1994) on expectations for hypothesis testing using 
asymmetric information-seeking strategies.  
Three alternative hypotheses might account for the relationship between the 
information-seeking preferences of participants and their expectations. First, the use of 
asymmetrically confirming questions might reflect the expectation of a hypothesis-
disconfirming response, whereas asymmetrically disconfirming queries might be associated 
with the expectation of a hypothesis-confirming response. While this hypothesis supports the 
view that individuals seek to maximize the probability of a hypothesis-confirming response 
(Skov & Sherman, 1986; Slowiaczek et al., 1992), this type of relationship has never been 
hypothesized, and it seems implausible for social-inference tasks (e.g., Poletiek & Berndsen, 
2000; Sacchi et al., in press). Second, consistent with claims made by Poletiek and Berndsen 
(2000), participants might expect highly diagnostic responses following asymmetric questions 
(i.e., hypothesis-confirming answers to asymmetrically confirming questions and hypothesis-
disconfirming answers to asymmetrically disconfirming questions). Third, participants’ 
confirming expectations might be greater following symmetric questions for which 
confirming-answer diagnosticity and frequency do not conflict when the hypotheses are 
equiprobable a priori compared with the confirming expectations following both 
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asymmetrically confirming and asymmetrically disconfirming questions which instead entail 
that the confirming answer is either rare or has low diagnosticity, respectively. 
Study 1 
Methods 
Participants 
The sample consisted of 75 undergraduate students at the University of Milano-
Bicocca; 52 women and 23 men between the ages of 19 and 40 years (M = 22.45, SD = 3.19) 
participated. All participants were Italian citizens. 
Materials and procedures 
Potential participants were recruited in libraries and study rooms at the University of 
Milano-Bicocca and asked to participate in a study investigating social information gathering. 
Those who agreed then completed a questionnaire. The initial set of questions obtained 
demographic information (i.e., gender, age, and nationality of participants). The participants 
were also presented with a list of questions used to investigate whether an anonymous target 
individual had certain personality traits. The set of personality characteristics was based on 
pilot results from a prior study (Sacchi et al., in press)2. For each personality trait (“creative”, 
“festive”, “rigid”, “untrustworthy”, “respectful”, or “dishonest”), the list of questions 
consisted of three asymmetrically confirming questions (e.g., “Has she/he ever been in 
prison?” to test the hypothesis that the target person was dishonest), three symmetric 
questions (e.g., “Does she/he keep her/his word?” to test the hypothesis that the individual 
was untrustworthy), and three asymmetrically disconfirming questions (e.g., “Does she/he 
like repetitive jobs?” to test the hypothesis that the individual was creative). The symmetric 
and asymmetrically confirming questions were positive (i.e., a “yes” answer confirmed the 
working hypothesis, and a “no” answer disconfirmed it), while the asymmetrically 
disconfirming queries were negative (i.e., a “no” answer confirmed the hypothesis, and a 
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“yes” answer disconfirmed it). The degree of asymmetry of the 54 questions used in the 
present study had been previously established (Sacchi et al., in press)3. Each trait and the list 
of questions for that trait were provided on a separate page of the questionnaire, and the six 
traits were presented in random order. 
For each trait, participants were required to (1) select three of the nine questions to 
determine whether the target individual had that personality trait, (2) report whether they 
expected to receive a “yes” or “no” response to each of the selected questions, and (3) 
estimate the probability (between 0% and 100%) that they would receive the expected answer.  
Once they completed the questionnaire, participants were debriefed and thanked for 
their participation. 
Results and discussion 
Participants were required to ask about different personality traits to ensure that no 
specific trait would influence the results. Accordingly, all the analyses collapsed over the trait 
factor.  
We performed an ANOVA with question type (symmetric, asymmetrically 
confirming, or asymmetrically disconfirming) as within-participant variable to analyze the 
probability that participants associated with the confirming answer (a “yes” following either 
asymmetrically confirming or symmetric questions and a “no” following asymmetrically 
disconfirming questions) averaged across the selections of the participants. When participants 
expected a disconfirming answer, the probability of the confirming response was calculated as 
the complement of the probability of the disconfirming answer. The main effect of question 
type was significant, F(2,144) = 3.67, MSE = 139.78, p = .028, η2 = .048, due to the 
significantly higher probability of confirming answers following symmetric questions 
compared with the probability of confirming answers following asymmetrically confirming 
queries, p = .005. Conversely, there was no significant difference between the probability of 
CONFIRMING EXPECTATIONS IN SOCIAL HYPOTHESIS TESTING 9
confirming answers following symmetrically and asymmetrically disconfirming questions, p 
= .21, and between the probability of confirming answers following asymmetrically 
confirming compared with asymmetrically disconfirming questions, p = .19. Three one-
sample t-tests against the expected value of .5 showed that the probability of confirming 
answers following symmetric questions was significantly higher than .5, t(73) = 5.75, two-
tailed p < .001, d = .67. Similarly, the probability of a confirming “no” answer following 
asymmetrically disconfirming queries was significantly higher than the expected value of .5, 
t(72) = 3.00, two-tailed p = .004, d = .35. Conversely, there was no significant difference 
between the probability of a confirming answer following asymmetrically confirming 
questions and the expected value of .5, t(73) = .77, two-tailed p = .44 (see Figure 1).  
Overall, these results suggest that participants were generally driven by confirming 
expectations. However, these expectations differed as a function of the question type that the 
participants selected. Indeed, symmetric questions, which do not have the 
diagnosticity/frequency trade-off when the prior probabilities of the hypotheses are equal, 
induced higher confirming expectations. When participants chose an asymmetrically 
disconfirming question, they more frequently anticipated a confirming answer (“no”) that was 
less diagnostic but more frequent compared with the more diagnostic, disconfirming answer 
(“yes”). This result is consistent with Skov and Sherman (1986)’s and Slowiaczek, Klayman, 
Sherman, and Skov (1992)’s interpretation of participants’ preference for this type of 
question, but it is at odds with Poletiek and Berndsen (2000)’s interpretation in terms of an 
individuals’ sensitivity to the diagnostic value of answers as opposed to the probability of 
occurrence. However, the participants’ sensitivity to the probability of the answers was not 
predominant. When choosing asymmetrically confirming questions, participants may have 
exhibited sensitivity to the greater probability of a disconfirming answer (“no”); however, 
CONFIRMING EXPECTATIONS IN SOCIAL HYPOTHESIS TESTING 10
participants did not exhibit significantly greater expectations for disconfirming answers than 
more diagnostic hypothesis-confirming answers (“yes”).  
Study 2 
In Study 1, we found that the participants’ expected probability of receiving 
confirming answers to the questions they selected was higher than the probability of receiving 
disconfirming answers. This tendency varied as a function of the chosen question type. In 
particular, we argued that this tendency was influenced by the diagnosticity/frequency trade-
off. Study 2 was devised to investigate the confirming expectations underlying the question 
selection in a different manner. In particular, we attempted to generalize the results of Study 1 
by comparing the response expectations for each question type when the traits under 
investigation were positive vs. negative and when questions were phrased as in Study 1 
(hereafter, direct questions) vs. their complementary versions (hereafter, inverse questions). 
Furthermore, in Study 2, we wanted to gauge whether and to what extent the participants’ 
probability of confirming answers differed from baseline levels. 
Methods 
Participants 
Eighty-three students (36 women and 47 men) at the University of Milano-Bicocca 
volunteered to participate in the study. They ranged in age from 20 to 38 years (M = 22.8, SD 
= 2.92). All participants were Italian. 
Materials and procedures 
We introduced two independent variables: trait valence and question phrasing. We 
selected four of the six traits used in Study 1 that could be converted to their opposite trait 
without using periphrases, namely “rigid”, “untrustworthy”, “respectful”, and “dishonest”. 
Trait valence was treated as a between-groups variable; therefore, one group was presented 
with positive traits (i.e., “flexible”, “trustworthy”, “respectful ”, and “honest”), and another 
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group received the negative counterparts (i.e., “rigid”, “untrustworthy”, “disrespectful”, and 
“dishonest”). In addition, we manipulated the phrasing of the questions between-groups. 
Specifically, one group received questions identical to Study 1 (direct questions), while 
another group received the complementary versions of those questions (inverse questions). 
For example, the direct question, “Does she/he become angry if contradicted?” to inquire 
about target’s rigidity was reversed to “Does she/he never become angry if contradicted?”.  
The manipulation of trait valence and question phrasing entailed a re-categorization of 
the asymmetrically confirming queries into asymmetrically disconfirming questions and vice-
versa for the questionnaires that included either negative traits and inverse questions or 
positive traits and direct questions relative to the classifications used in Study 1. For example, 
the asymmetrically disconfirming question “Has she/he never betrayed the trust of people 
bound to her/him?” used in Study 1 to test “untrustworthy” was re-categorized as 
asymmetrically confirming when the questionnaire included direct queries and the trait being 
tested was “trustworthy”. When the questionnaire included inverse questions, the phrasing 
was changed to “Has she/he ever betrayed the trust of people bound to her/him?”, and this 
was considered an asymmetrically confirming question when testing “untrustworthy”.  
Similarly, symmetric questions were categorized as negative (i.e., a “yes” answer 
falsified the hypothesized trait, while a “no” answer was hypothesis-confirming) for negative 
traits and inverse questions as well as for positive traits and direct questions. For 
questionnaires with either positive traits and inverse questions or negative traits and direct 
questions, the symmetric questions were categorized as positive (i.e., a “yes” answer was 
hypothesis-confirming).  
Both task requirements and procedures were identical to Study 1.  
Results and discussion 
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To determine which question type most frequently induced expectations for a 
confirming answer, we calculated (summing the three selections that participants made) the 
ratio of the number of each question type for which a confirming answer was expected to the 
total number of questions of that type. This measure allowed us to determine the extent to 
which each participant expected a confirming response for each question type without the 
confound of the participant’s actual preference for selecting that question type. A 3 × 2 × 2 
mixed-design ANOVA with within-participant variable question type (asymmetrically 
confirming, symmetric, and asymmetrically disconfirming), between-participant variables 
trait valence (positive vs. negative), and question phrasing (direct vs. inverse) was performed. 
The main effect of question type was significant, F(1,74) = 5.36, MSE = .16, p = .023, η2 = 
.049, lower-bound correction. This effect indicates that participants more frequently expected 
the confirming answer when choosing symmetric questions (M = .71, SDE = .03) compared 
with either asymmetrically confirming (M = .59, SDE = .04), p = .005 or asymmetrically 
disconfirming questions (M = .58, SDE = .04), p = .001, while there was no difference 
between the expectation of confirming answers after asymmetrically confirming vs. 
asymmetrically disconfirming questions, p = .81. Furthermore, three one-sample t-tests 
against the expected value of .5 revealed that the confirming-response expectations following 
symmetric questions were significantly higher than .5, t(78) = 4.94, two-tailed p < .001, d = 
.54, while asymmetrically confirming questions, t(81) = 1.89, two-tailed p = .062, d = .21, and 
asymmetrically disconfirming questions, t(81) = 1.81, two-tailed p = .075, d = .19, did not 
reach statistical significance. These findings are parallel to those of Study 1 in that symmetric 
questions induced expectations for confirming responses more often than the two types of 
asymmetric questions. Again, this might be because confirming answers to symmetric 
questions, as opposed to asymmetric questions, do not suffer from the diagnosticity/frequency 
trade-off when the prior probabilities of the hypotheses are equal, i.e., a confirming answer to 
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a symmetric query might be both moderately diagnostic and frequent. By contrast, confirming 
answers to asymmetric questions might be either highly diagnostic but rare or highly frequent 
but with low diagnostic value. This might explain the lack of difference between the two 
types of asymmetric questions and why participants expected far less confirming answers to 
these questions compared with symmetric questions. 
There were no significant main effects of either trait valence or question phrasing, Fs 
≤ 2.61, ps ≥ .11. Neither the question type by trait valence interaction nor the question type by 
question phrasing interaction were significant, Fs ≤ 1.75, ps ≥ .19, lower-bound correction. 
There was a significant trait valence by question phrasing interaction, F(1,74) = 15.65, MSE = 
.13, p < .001, η2 = .020, which will not be discussed further because it is beyond the scope of 
the present contribution. Finally, there was a significant three-way interaction between 
question type, trait valence, and question phrasing, F(1,74) = 27.6, MSE = .16, p < .001, η2 = 
.250. In particular, participants expected a confirming answer following the symmetric 
questions more frequently for inverse (M = .98, SDE = .05) than direct questions (M = .52, 
SDE = .05), p < .001 for positive traits, while there were no differences for either 
asymmetrically confirming, p = .52, or asymmetrically disconfirming questions, p = .99. By 
contrast, for negative traits, participants’ expectations for confirming-answers following 
symmetric questions were significantly higher for direct (M = 1.00, SDE = .06) than inverse 
questions (M = .34, SDE = .05), p < .001. The same tendency also applied to asymmetrically 
disconfirming questions, although to a lesser extent. Expectations for confirming-answers 
were higher for direct (M = .61, SDE = .08) than inverse questions (M = .38, SDE = .08), p = 
.050. No significant effect for question phrasing in asymmetrically confirming questions was 
found, p = .18. This finding might be because the manipulation of both trait valence and 
question phrasing entailed that for some symmetric questions (for which the interaction effect 
was greatest), the confirming answer was “yes”, while for other symmetric queries, the 
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confirming answer was “no”. Accordingly, participants appear to be prone to more frequently 
expecting a confirming answer when the confirming answer was “yes” than when the 
confirming answer was “no”. This preference for “yes” confirming answers rather than “no” 
might be due to the further processing step required to interpret the confirming value of “no” 
as opposed to “yes”.  
We then examined the probability that participants associated with the expected 
confirming answers for each question type. We compared the participants’ probability 
estimates with the blind judges’ estimates used to measure the degree of a/symmetry of 
questions in the Sacchi et al.’s study (in press). In particular, those judges were asked to infer 
the presence/absence of the behaviors described in the questions formulated by independent 
participants given the presence/absence of some personality traits. Accordingly, the blind 
judges’ estimates provided us with baseline data to assess the presence and extent of the 
adjustments that participants’ expectations induced in the current study. 
Specifically, for each question and trait, we computed the probability of receiving a 
confirming/disconfirming answer by averaging the blind judges’ estimates. From a formal 
(Bayesian) standpoint, this required the computation of ( )Dp  for each blind judge (the 
probability of receiving a confirming answer to a question or in a logically equivalent 
phrasing, the probability of occurrence of a behavior). This was determined by the following 
equation: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )HpHDpHpHDpDp ¬×¬+×= || , 
where ( )HDp |  and ( )HDp ¬|  are the probabilities of observing a behavior ( D ) 
given that the hypothesized trait is true ( H ) or false ( H¬ ), respectively. Each conditional 
probability is weighted by the prior probability of observing the hypothesized trait in the 
population ( ( )Hp ¬  was computed as the complement of ( )Hp ). 
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For negative queries, the probability associated with a confirming answer was 
computed as follows: 
( ) ( )DpDp −=¬ 1 .  
Finally, we calculated the probability Δ for a confirming answer for each participant, 
question, and trait combination. Specifically, Δ was computed as follows: 
Δ = participants’ estimate − mean blind judges’ estimates. 
Accordingly, when Δ assumes a value of zero, there is alignment between participants 
and judges. When Δ assumes positive values, participants’ estimates are overestimated 
compared with the baseline values, while when Δ is negative, participants’ estimates are 
underestimated compared with the baseline values. Confirming expectations are reflected by 
positive Δ values. 
As in Study 1, the participants’ probability estimates were averaged across the 
selections that participants made, and the estimates were recoded to ensure that when a 
disconfirming answer was expected, the probability of the confirming answer was computed 
as its complement. Using Δ as dependent variable, we performed a 3 × 2 × 2 mixed-design 
ANOVA using question type (asymmetrically confirming, symmetric, asymmetrically 
disconfirming) as the within-participant variable and question valence (positive vs. negative) 
and question phrasing (direct vs. inverse) as between-participant variables. Only the question 
type demonstrated significant main effects, F(1,76) = 10.24, MSE = 533.22, p = .002, η2 = 
.111, lower-bound correction. Neither the main effect of question valence nor the main effect 
of question phrasing were significant, Fs ≤ 2.5, ps ≥ .12. No interaction reached the 
significance level, Fs ≤ 3.31, ps ≥ .07, lower-bound correction. The significant main effect of 
question type was due to the positive Δ found for symmetric questions, which was 
significantly higher than both the negative Δs associated to both types of asymmetric queries 
(i.e., either confirming or disconfirming), ps < .001. By contrast, no significant difference 
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emerged between the Δs associated to asymmetrically confirming vs. asymmetrically 
disconfirming questions, p = .49. Three one-sample t-tests against the expected value of 0 
confirmed that the Δ relative to symmetric questions was significantly higher than zero, t(82) 
= 4.27, two-tailed p < .001, d = .47, while the Δs relative to either asymmetrically confirming, 
t(80) = -.91, two-tailed p = .37, or asymmetrically disconfirming questions, t(81) = -.01, two-
tailed p = .99, did not significantly differ from zero (see Figure 2). Therefore, the comparison 
between the probability estimates of expected confirming answers (participants) vs. 
confirming behaviors (judges) dovetailed with the results of the previous analyses, showing 
that symmetric questions induced confirming expectations to a significantly greater extent 
than either asymmetrically confirming or asymmetrically disconfirming questions. In 
particular, the finding that the Δs of asymmetrically confirming and asymmetrically 
disconfirming questions did not significantly differ from zero (i.e., the value that indicates 
calibration) or each other demonstrated that both disadvantages entailed by the 
diagnosticity/frequency trade-off (i.e., either the rareness or low diagnosticity of the outcome) 
are perceived as equally important by participants. However, although not significant, the 
comparison between the two types of asymmetric queries again revealed that participants 
tended to favor the more likely rather than the more diagnostic outcome (see Figure 2). 
Discussion 
This study investigated if the use of asymmetric or symmetric hypothesis-testing 
strategies when making social inferences was based on the expectation of receiving a 
hypothesis-confirming answer. In recent studies of social cognition, it has been argued that 
the use of an asymmetrically confirming strategy (i.e., asking questions for which the 
confirming answer is more diagnostic than the disconfirming answer) leads to a bias in favor 
of the hypothesis being tested because a disconfirming answer only weakly falsifies the 
working hypothesis compared with the strong support provided by a confirming answer (e.g., 
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Trope & Thompson, 1997). However, an asymmetric search strategy implies a trade-off 
between the diagnosticity and probability of the anticipated answers when the prior 
probabilities of the hypotheses are equal (e.g., McKenzie, 2006; Poletiek, 2001, chaps. 1 and 
2; Poletiek & Berndsen, 2000). For asymmetrically confirming questions, confirming 
answers, while more diagnostic than the disconfirming answers, are also more rare. For 
example, a hypothesis-confirming answer (“yes”) to the question “Have you ever been in 
prison?” is more diagnostic when testing the hypothesis that an individual is dishonest than 
the hypothesis-disconfirming answer (“no”) because one might be dishonest without having 
been in prison. However, the hypothesis-confirming answer (“yes”) is also less common than 
a “no” response because fewer people have been in prison compared with those who have 
never been in prison. Whether people are more sensitive to the diagnosticity or probability of 
the anticipated answers is currently being debated (e.g., Poletiek & Berndsen, 2000; Skov & 
Sherman, 1986) and is the focus of recent experimental research (Sacchi et al., submitted). 
Identifying which answers people expect to receive to their hypothesis-testing questions is 
crucial for determining the relationship between information-seeking strategies and 
confirmation bias.  
While Evett et al. (1994) addressed this issue, their analysis focused only on the use of 
positive or negative questions, which do not have the same implications for confirmation bias 
as asymmetric queries. Positive questions do not necessarily entail confirming tendencies, 
although they might reveal inefficiencies in information gathering (e.g., Klayman, 1995; 
Klayman & Ha, 1987; McKenzie, 2004; Trope & Thompson, 1997). Furthermore, 
positivity/negativity and symmetry/asymmetry are independent properties of questions 
(Cherubini et al., 2010). 
The present study was designed to investigate the expectations underlying the 
selection of asymmetric or symmetric questions. To judge whether a target person possessed a 
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particular personality trait, participants were required to select questions from a list composed 
of symmetric, asymmetrically confirming, and asymmetrically disconfirming questions and to 
report the expected answer and its likelihood to the selected questions. Overall, participants 
had greater confirming-answer expectations following the selection of symmetric questions 
compared with choosing both types of asymmetric queries. This result also emerged when the 
valence of the traits under investigation and the phrasing of the questions (which were also 
presented to participants with a inverse phrasing) were manipulated. We argue that the higher 
confirming expectations following symmetric questions might be due to the absence of the 
diagnosticity/frequency trade-off because symmetric questions entail moderate diagnostic and 
frequent confirming answers when the prior probabilities of the hypotheses are equal.  
The lack of difference between asymmetrically confirming and asymmetrically 
disconfirming questions in inducing expectations for confirming answers was also consistent 
between both studies. We interpreted this finding in terms of participants’ perception of both 
types of disadvantages (i.e., rareness and low diagnosticity) entailed by the 
diagnosticity/frequency trade-off. It appears as though participants treated the expectations of 
a rare confirming response and those of a low diagnostic confirming response equally. 
Participants exhibited a tendency to be more sensitive to the probability of outcome 
occurrence, shown by the higher probabilities associated with confirming answers following 
asymmetrically disconfirming vs. asymmetrically confirming queries in Study 1 and the 
comparison against the expected value of zero, which was significant for the (likely) 
confirming responses to asymmetrically disconfirming questions, but not for the (highly 
diagnostic) confirming responses to asymmetrically confirming questions (see Figure 1).  
 Future research should explore whether the confirming expectations found in this 
social information-gathering task have implications for evaluating the answers provided by a 
target individual and overall judgment and impression formation. It has been argued that a 
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confirmation bias can only be determined if people exhibit particular combinations of 
information-seeking bias and bias in evidence evaluation (e.g., Klayman, 1995; McKenzie, 
2004, 2006). The implications of confirming expectations for intergroup processes should 
also be investigated. This issue is especially relevant for understanding the psychological 
mechanisms underlying the resistance to stereotype change (e.g., Johnston, 1996; Johnston, 
Hewstone, Pendry, & Frankish, 1994; Moreno & Bodenhausen, 1999). 
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Footnotes 
1 Note that the diagnosticity/frequency trade-off cannot be generalized to all contexts in which 
people formulate questions. In particular, when the prior probabilities of the hypotheses are 
unequal (for example, when people rely on stereotype-based knowledge; see, e.g., Trope & 
Thompson, 1997), there might not be a trade-off between diagnosticity and frequency (e.g., a 
hypothesis-confirming answer to an asymmetrically confirming query might be both highly 
diagnostic and frequent). Therefore, our analysis is confined to cases in which no strong a 
priori beliefs are involved. Participants in the present study were asked to estimate the a priori 
probability of a social target to possess the hypothesized traits. Their mean rating on 1 to 7 
scales fluctuated around the midpoint (i.e., 4.05 in Study 1 and 3.65 in Study 2), indicating 
that they were not influenced by strong a priori beliefs in their judgments. 
2 We used the six traits pretested in Sacchi et al. (in press), specifically “rigid”, “respectful”, 
“festive”, “untrustworthy”, “dishonest”, and “creative” because they were balanced in terms 
of valence, and the asymmetry indexes of the questions presented to participants in the 
present experiment were calibrated relative to these traits. 
3 Sacchi et al. (in press) computed the questions’ asymmetry indexes based on the estimates 
provided by the 74 judges asked to make inferences with regards to both the questions 
produced by the 37 independent participants and their corresponding answers. The judges 
were unaware of the target of the questions generated by the other participants. The judges’ 
estimates were used to compute the asymmetry index according to the following formula (the 
same formula was used by Trope & Thompson, 1997): 
( ) ( )DHpDHp ¬¬− || , 
where ( )DHp |  is the conditional probability of possessing the hypothesized trait given a 
hypothesis-confirming answer to the question and ( )DHp ¬¬ |  is the conditional probability 
of not having the trait given a hypothesis-disconfirming answer to the same question. For 
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pragmatic reasons (i.e., to avoid the use of a double negative), ( )DHp ¬¬ |  was computed as 
the complement of ( )DHp ¬| . Questions in which the asymmetry index was closest to 0 
were chosen as symmetric questions, those with an asymmetry index closest to 1 were 
selected as asymmetrically confirming questions, and those with an asymmetry index closest 
to -1 were chosen as asymmetrically disconfirming queries. The asymmetry polarization of 
the questions was balanced.
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Figure 1. Mean probability associated with the confirming answer for each question type in 
Study 1. Error bars represent the standard errors of the means (SEMs). 
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Figure 2. The Δ between the participants’ and judges’ confirming-answer probability 
estimates for each question type in Study 2. Error bars represent the standard errors of the 
means (SEMs). 
